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Settlement delay as a sorting device

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  • Miceli, Thomas J.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 265-274

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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:265-274

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle

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  1. Salant, Stephen W, 1989. "When Is Inducing Self-selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 391-97, May.
  2. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 1996. "A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, January.
  3. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
  4. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1988. "The deterrent effects of settlements and trials," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-116, June.
  5. Chiang, Raymond & Spatt, Chester S, 1982. "Imperfect Price Discrimination and Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 155-81, April.
  6. Spier, Kathryn E, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108, January.
  7. Daughety, A. & Reinganum, J., 1991. "Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation," Working Papers 91-23, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  8. Shavell, Steven, 1997. "The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 575-612, June.
  9. Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, 1996. "The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 310-321, Summer.
  10. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February.
  11. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
  12. Miceli, Thomas J., 1993. "Optimal deterrence of nuisance suits by repeat defendants," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 135-144, June.
  13. Wang, Gyu Ho & Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Yi, Jong-Goo, 1994. "Litigation and Pretrial Negotiation under Incomplete Information," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 187-200, April.
  14. Kessler, Daniel, 1996. "Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 432-60, October.
  15. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter.
  16. Gravelle, H. S. E., 1990. "Rationing trials by waiting: Welfare implications," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 255-270, December.
  17. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
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Cited by:
  1. Ormosi, Peter L., 2012. "Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 370-377.

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