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Tactical dilatory practice in litigation: Evidence from EC merger proceedings

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  • Ormosi, Peter L.
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    Abstract

    The economic analysis of delay in legal procedures has received considerable attention in the past. Some of these works focus on the determinants of delay in litigation but very little analysis has been dedicated to examining if tactical delay may actually help the settlement process. The paper shows that in European merger litigation merging parties may decide to tactically challenge discovery attempts, which causes a delay that is strategically used to gain more time to take the necessary steps to avoid a lengthy in-depth investigation. This type of delay can be beneficial to both merging parties and could also contribute to the saving of regulatory resources, and reduce the risks threatening the success of a potentially efficiency enhancing merger.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 370-377

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:32:y:2012:i:4:p:370-377

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle

    Related research

    Keywords: Settlement delay; Litigation costs; Antitrust law; EC merger proceedings;

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    References

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    1. Duso, Tomaso & Guglery, Klaus & Szücs, Florian, 2010. "An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 337, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. Bertrand Chopard & Thomas Cortade & Eric Langlais, 2008. "Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties," EconomiX Working Papers 2008-32, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
    3. Fenn, Paul & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Delay and Settlement in Litigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(457), pages 476-91, July.
    4. Cosnita, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2009. "Negotiating remedies: Revealing the merger efficiency gains," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 188-196, March.
    5. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1984. "Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
    6. Gong, Jiong & McAfee, R Preston, 2000. "Pretrial Negotiation, Litigation, and Procedural Rules," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 218-38, April.
    7. Oliver Hart, 1986. "Bargaining and Strikes," Working papers 423, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    8. Wang, Gyu Ho & Kim, Jeong-Yoo & Yi, Jong-Goo, 1994. "Litigation and Pretrial Negotiation under Incomplete Information," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 187-200, April.
    9. Williams, Philip L. & Williams, Ross A., 1994. "The cost of civil litigation: An empirical study," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 73-86, March.
    10. Spier, Kathryn E, 1992. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 93-108, January.
    11. Miceli, Thomas J., 1999. "Settlement delay as a sorting device," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 265-274, June.
    12. Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, 1996. "The Timing of Out-of-Court Settlements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 310-321, Summer.
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    Cited by:
    1. Florian Smuda & Patrice Bougette & Kai Hüschelrath, 2014. "Determinants of the Duration of European Appellate Court Proceedings in Cartel Cases," GREDEG Working Papers, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis 2014-25, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.

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