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Forgoing invention to deter entry

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  • Creane, Anthony
  • Miyagiwa, Kaz

Abstract

A monopoly facing potential entry may not want to develop an efficient technology even at zero R&D costs. Such a phenomenon occurs if a new technology is distinct from the existing one so production uncertainty becomes technology-specific. Then the monopoly can reduce the entrant's post-entry profit to the point of deterrence by using the existing technology with which the entrant would enter. We show that the monopoly develops a new technology when the entrant faces a sufficiently high or low entry cost but forgoes invention when the entry cost is intermediate. These results hold both in quantity and price competition.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 27 (2009)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 632-638

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:27:y:2009:i:5:p:632-638

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

Related research

Keywords: Invention Entry cost Entry deterrence Production uncertainty Correlation of strategies;

References

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  1. Reinganum, Jennifer R., 1982. "Uncertain Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 431, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June.
  3. Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1987. "Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 211-231, Summer.
  4. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1983. "Raising Rivals' Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(2), pages 267-71, May.
  5. Jay Pil Choi & Sang-Seung Yi, 2000. "Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 717-743, Winter.
  6. Michael Waldman, 1985. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," UCLA Economics Working Papers 364, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September.
  8. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 581-95, September.
  9. Eric S. Maskin, 1999. "Uncertainty and entry deterrence," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 429-437.
  10. Takalo, Tuomas & Kanniainen, Vesa, 2000. "Do patents slow down technological progress?: Real options in research, patenting, and market introduction," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 1105-1127, October.
  11. Salop, Steven C, 1979. "Strategic Entry Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 335-38, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Mizuno, Tomomichi & Takauchi, Kazuhiro, 2013. "Rules of origin and uncertain cost of compliance," MPRA Paper 44431, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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