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The Profitable Suppression of Inventions: Technology Choice and Entry Deterrence

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Author Info
Anthony Creane
Kaz Miyagiwa

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Abstract

AT&T was known for both funding a world-class research lab and delaying deployment of useful innovations from the lab. To explain this behavior we consider a model with an incumbent facing a potential entrant. The incumbent can choose from two technologies for production: old and new. The entrant's choice is limited to the old. We show that, under correlated production uncertainty, use of the common technology exposes the entrant to a greater risk. Therefore, the incumbent may suppress a newer, more efficient technology in favor of the old as a means to deter entry.

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Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number 0702.

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Date of creation: Nov 2007
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Handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0702

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  1. Jay Pil Choi & Sang-Seung Yi, 2000. "Vertical Foreclosure with the Choice of Input Specifications," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 717-743, Winter.
  2. Avinash Dixit, 1979. "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 20-32, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1987. "Oligopolistic Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 211-231, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Salop, Steven C & Scheffman, David T, 1987. "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 19-34, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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