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Stability in matching markets with peer effects

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  • Bykhovskaya, Anna

Abstract

The paper investigates conditions which guarantee the existence of a stable outcome in a school matching in the presence of peer effects. We consider an economy where students are characterized by their type and schools are characterized by their quality and capacity. We divide students and schools into groups, so that going to a school outside of one's group is associated with additional costs or prohibited. A student receives utility from a school per se and from one's classmates.

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  • Bykhovskaya, Anna, 2020. "Stability in matching markets with peer effects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 28-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:122:y:2020:i:c:p:28-54
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.010
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    1. Rajnish Kunar & Kriti Manocha & Josue Ortega, 2020. "On the integration of Shapley-Scarf housing markets," Papers 2004.09075, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    2. Eduardo Duque & Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez, 2022. "The Strong Effects of Weak Externalities on School Choice," Working Papers wp542, University of Chile, Department of Economics.

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