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Matching with Contracts: Comment

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  • John William Hatfield
  • Fuhito Kojima
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    Abstract

    Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) present a unified model of matching with contracts phrased in terms of hospitals and doctors, which subsumes the standard two-sided matching and some package auction models. They show that a stable allocation exists if contracts are substitutes for each hospital. They further claim that if a hospital's preferences violate the substitutes condition, there exist singleton preferences for the other hospitals and doctors such that no stable allocation exists. We show this last claim does not hold in general. We further present a weaker condition that is necessary to guarantee the existence of stable allocations.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 98 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 3 (June)
    Pages: 1189-94

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    Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:1189-94

    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.1189
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    Cited by:
    1. Jeremy T. Fox, 2008. "Estimating Matching Games with Transfers," NBER Working Papers 14382, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Toyotaka Sakai, 2011. "A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 337-342, December.
    3. Vilmos Komornik & Christelle Viauroux, 2012. "Conditional Stable Matchings," UMBC Economics Department Working Papers 12-03, UMBC Department of Economics.
    4. John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 176-208, February.
    5. Kojima, Fuhito, 2013. "Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 1-14.
    6. Jeremy T. Fox, 2010. "Identification in matching games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 203-254, November.
    7. Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "An analysis of the German university admissions system," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 561-589, August.
    8. Hatfield, John William & Immorlica, Nicole & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2012. "Testing substitutability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 639-645.
    9. Hatfield, John William & Kojima, Fuhito, 2010. "Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1704-1723, September.
    10. Roessler, Christian & Koellinger, Philipp, 2012. "Entrepreneurship and organization design," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 888-902.

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