Reference models and incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: An evaluation of Sweden's Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM)
AbstractElectricity sector reforms across the world have led to a search for innovative approaches to regulation that promote efficiency in the natural monopoly distribution networks and reduce their service charges. To this aim, a number of countries have adopted incentive regulation models based on efficiency benchmarking. While most regulators have used parametric and non-parametric frontier-based methods of benchmarking some have adopted engineering-designed "reference firm" or "norm" models. This paper examines the incentive properties and related aspects of the reference firm model--NPAM--as used in Sweden and compares this with frontier-based benchmarking methods. We identify a number of important differences between the two approaches that are not readily apparent and discuss their ramifications for the regulatory objectives and process. We conclude that, on balance, the reference models are less appropriate as benchmarks than real firms. Also, the implementation framework based on annual ex-post reviews exacerbates the regulatory problems mainly by increasing uncertainty and reducing the incentive for innovation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Energy Policy.
Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Other versions of this item:
- Jamasb, T. & Pollitt, M., 2007. "Reference Models and Incentive Regulation of Electricity Distribution Networks: An Evaluation of Sweden’s Network Performance Assessment Model (NPAM)," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0747, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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