Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Banning banking in EU emissions trading?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Schleich, Joachim
  • Ehrhart, Karl-Martin
  • Hoppe, Christian
  • Seifert, Stefan

Abstract

Admitting banking in emissions trading systems reduces overall compliance costs by allowing for inter-temporal flexibility: cost savings can be traded over time. However, unless individual EU Member States (MS) decide differently, the transfer of unused allowances from the period of 2005-2007 into the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. 2008�2012, will be prohib-ited. In this paper, we first explore the implications of such a ban on banking when initial emission targets are lenient. This analysis is based on a simulation which was recently carried out in Germany with companies and with a student control group. The findings suggest that an EU-wide ban on banking would lead to efficiency losses in addition to those losses which arise from the lack of inter-temporal flexibility. Second, we use simple game-theoretic considerations to argue that, under reasonable assumptions, such an EU-wide ban on banking will be the equilibrium outcome. Thus, to avoid a possible prisoners� dilemma, MS should co-ordinate their banking decisions.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V2W-4D10KS8-2/2/cf89016bd8dc7f54e08d8d9e8fa9e265
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Energy Policy.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 112-120

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:112-120

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kling, Catherine & Rubin, Jonathan, 1997. "Bankable permits for the control of environmental pollution," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 101-115, April.
  2. Ellerman,A. Denny & Joskow,Paul L. & Schmalensee,Richard & Montero,Juan-Pablo & Bailey,Elizabeth M., 2000. "Markets for Clean Air," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521660839, 9.
    • Ellerman,A. Denny & Joskow,Paul L. & Schmalensee,Richard & Montero,Juan-Pablo & Bailey,Elizabeth M., 2005. "Markets for Clean Air," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521023894, 9.
  3. Akhurst, Mark & Morgheim, Jeff & Lewis, Rachel, 2003. "Greenhouse gas emissions trading in BP," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(7), pages 657-663, June.
  4. Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quirion, 2002. "Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences," Post-Print halshs-00007264, HAL.
  5. Newell, Richard G & Stavins, Robert N, 2003. "Cost Heterogeneity and the Potential Savings from Market-Based Policies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 43-59, January.
  6. R. Andrew Muller, 1999. "Experimental Methods for Research into Trading of Greenhouse Gas Emissions," Department of Economics Working Papers 1999-14, McMaster University.
  7. Ellerman, A.D. & Juan-Pablo Montero, 2002. "The Temporal Efficiency of SO2 Emissions Trading," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0231, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  8. Plott, Charles R., . "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 405, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Loewenstein, George, 1999. "Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages F23-34, February.
  10. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
  11. Editors, 2003. "Editor's Introduction," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 645-648, October.
  12. Editors, 2003. "Editor's Introduction," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 315-318, 04.
  13. Stuart Mestelman & Andrew Muller, 1997. "What Have We Learned From Emissions Trading Experiments?," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications, McMaster University 1997-03, McMaster University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:34:y:2006:i:1:p:112-120. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.