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A model of the operation and development of a National Oil Company

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  • Hartley, Peter
  • Medlock III, Kenneth B.

Abstract

We present a model of the exploration and development activities of a National Oil Company (NOC), which uses similar technology to a private firm to extract a depletable resource. However, unlike the private firm, the NOC may have a wider range of objectives than maximizing the present value of profits. Specifically, we assume an objective function that balances firm profitability against a political desire to favor domestic consumer surplus and domestic employment. We find that the non-commercial objectives faced by a NOC tend to reinforce each other in their effects on profitability, the timing of cash flows and employment.

Suggested Citation

  • Hartley, Peter & Medlock III, Kenneth B., 2008. "A model of the operation and development of a National Oil Company," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 2459-2485, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:30:y:2008:i:5:p:2459-2485
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