A welfare comparison of private and public monopoly
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 48 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- Roemer, J.E. & Silvestre, J., 1989. "A Welfare Comparison Of Private And Public Monopoly," Papers 340, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
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