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Short communication: DEA based auctions simulations

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  • Papakonstantinou, Athanasios
  • Bogetoft, Peter

Abstract

In this paper we use simulations to numerically evaluate the Hybrid DEA – Second Score Auction. In a procurement setting, the winner of the Hybrid auction by design receives payment at the most equal to the Second Score auction. It is therefore superior to the traditional Second Score scheme from the point of view of a principal interested in acquiring an item at the minimum price without losing in quality. For a set of parameters we quantify the size of the improvements and show that the improvement depends intimately on the regularity imposed on the underlying cost function. In the least structured case of a variable returns to scale technology, the hybrid auction only improved the outcome for a small percentage of cases. For other technologies with constant returns to scale, the gains are considerably higher and payments are lowered in a large percentage of cases. We also show that the number of the participating agents, the concavity of the principal value functions, and the number of quality dimensions impact the expected payment.

Suggested Citation

  • Papakonstantinou, Athanasios & Bogetoft, Peter, 2013. "Short communication: DEA based auctions simulations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 231(2), pages 507-511.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:231:y:2013:i:2:p:507-511
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
    2. Falagario, Marco & Sciancalepore, Fabio & Costantino, Nicola & Pietroforte, Roberto, 2012. "Using a DEA-cross efficiency approach in public procurement tenders," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 218(2), pages 523-529.
    3. Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2008. "DEA based auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(2), pages 685-700, January.
    4. Peter Bogetoft & Lars Otto, 2011. "Benchmarking with DEA, SFA, and R," International Series in Operations Research and Management Science, Springer, number 978-1-4419-7961-2, December.
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