Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach
AbstractThis article addresses two important issues in crowd-sourcing: ex ante uncertainty about the quality and cost of different workers and strategic behaviour. We present a novel multi-dimensional auction that incentivises the workers to make partial enquiry into the task and to honestly report quality-cost estimates based on which the crowd-sourcer can choose the worker that offers the best value for money. The mechanism extends second score auction design to settings where the quality is uncertain and it provides incentives to both collect information and deliver desired qualities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 44236.
Date of creation: 06 Feb 2013
Date of revision:
crowd-sourcing; Multi-dimensional auctions; Yardstick competition; Score functions; Strictly proper scoring rules;
Other versions of this item:
- Papakonstantinou, A. & Bogetoft, P., 2013. "Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach," MPRA Paper 46055, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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