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An auction mechanism for platoon leader determination in single-brand cooperative vehicle platooning

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  • Sun, Xiaotong
  • Yin, Yafeng

Abstract

Cooperative vehicle platooning enabled by connected automated vehicle (CAV) technology has been identified to bring energy savings and driving-effort reduction. However, the intrinsic difference of gained benefits between the leading vehicle and the following vehicles hampers the spontaneous platooning via peer-to-peer coordination. This study proposes an auction mechanism that determines the leader–follower positioning together with the associated benefits, for facilitating the formation and maintaining the behavioral stability of vehicle platoons in a distributed way. We theoretically prove that there is no mechanism to achieve an efficient outcome in an ex post equilibrium, requiring individual rationality and budget balance. In this regard, we provide a truthful ε-approximate auction mechanism that deploys a linear transfer function, which guarantees that the implemented outcome is an efficient approximate dominant strategy equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Sun, Xiaotong & Yin, Yafeng, 2021. "An auction mechanism for platoon leader determination in single-brand cooperative vehicle platooning," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:28:y:2021:i:c:s221201222100037x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2021.100233
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    Cited by:

    1. Yu, Xiaojuan & van den Berg, Vincent A.C. & Verhoef, Erik T. & Li, Zhi-Chun, 2022. "Will all autonomous cars cooperate? Brands’ strategic interactions under dynamic congestion," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    2. Bouchery, Yann & Hezarkhani, Behzad & Stauffer, Gautier, 2022. "Coalition formation and cost sharing for truck platooning," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 15-34.
    3. Chen, Shukai & Wang, Hua & Meng, Qiang, 2023. "Cost allocation of cooperative autonomous truck platooning: Efficiency and stability analysis," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 119-141.
    4. Barua, Limon & Zou, Bo & Choobchian, Pooria, 2023. "Maximizing truck platooning participation with preferences," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).

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