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Bonus for firearms seizures and police performance

Author

Listed:
  • Barros, Fernando
  • Delalibera, Bruno R.
  • Neto, Valdemar Pinho
  • Rodrigues, Victor

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of monetary incentives for firearms seizures on police performance and public safety outcomes. Using data from Brazilian states, we evaluate the impact of Pernambuco’s Pact for Life (Pacto pela Vida) Program, which offers a monetary bonus to police officers for firearms seizures and other outcomes. Our results indicate that the bonus has a causal and positive impact on the number of firearms seizures by police officers. Although we see a decrease in the number of crimes in Pernambuco, it is not possible to be attributed to the bonus policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Barros, Fernando & Delalibera, Bruno R. & Neto, Valdemar Pinho & Rodrigues, Victor, 2022. "Bonus for firearms seizures and police performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:217:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522002294
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110681
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary incentives; Policing; Firearms seizures; Policy evaluation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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