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Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents

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  • Ohashi, Yoshihiro

Abstract

The efficient outcome of a deposit contract model is uniquely implementable with relatively partially honest agents, while it is never uniquely implementable only with materially self-interest agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Ohashi, Yoshihiro, 2016. "Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 21-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:146:y:2016:i:c:p:21-23
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.014
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Antoine Martin, 2006. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 197-211, May.
    2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
    3. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
    4. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    5. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier & Holden, Richard, 2014. "Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 284-290.
    6. , & ,, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
    7. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
    8. Ortner, Juan, 2015. "Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 1-16.
    9. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1099, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Choi, Tsan-Ming & Shi, Xiutian, 2022. "Reducing supply risks by supply guarantee deposit payments in the fashion industry in the “new normal after COVID-19”," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2018. "Bank Runs and Minimum Reciprocity," CARF F-Series CARF-F-447, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Preference for honesty; Implementation; Mechanism design; Behavioral economics; Bank run;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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