Equilibrium of a sequence of auctions when bidders demand multiple items
AbstractWe construct an ex post perfect equilibrium in a sequence of second-price auctions with two bidders where each bidder's marginal values for additional units are decreasing. This equilibrium implies an increasing path of transaction prices and is ex post efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 112 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Sequential auctions Ex post perfect equilibrium Declining price anomaly;
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- Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
- Katzman, Brett, 1999. "A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 77-99, May.
- BalÃ¡zs Szentes, 2007. "Two-Object Two-Bidder Simultaneous Auctions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 483-493.
- McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
- Yao, Zhiyong & Xiao, Zhiguo, 2013. "A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 276-281.
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