This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Christine Zulehner ()
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
The objectives of this study are to investigate the institutional speci¯cs of sequential cattle auctions and their role as determinants of prices. Institutional speci¯cs are the order of sale according to quality, a secret reserve price, bidders' multi-unit demand and di®erent types of bidders. Prices decline and bidders with a higher demand pay on average lower prices. The estimation results show that declining prices are caused by the order of sale according to quality and the secret reserve price. The results further show that bidders take the strategic e®ect of sequential auctions and multi-unit demand into account.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number
0705.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Sep 2007Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0705Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Paper Administrator).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Laffont, J.-J. & Loisel, P. & Robert, J., 1998.
"Intra-Day Dynamics in Sequential Auctions: Theory and Estimation ,"
Papers
98.488, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
Harry J. Paarsch & Stephen G. Donald & Jacques Robert, 2006.
"An empirical model of the multi-unit, sequential, clock auction ,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics ,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(8), pages 1221-1247.
[Downloadable!]
Paarsch, Harry J., 1992.
"Deciding between the common and private value paradigms in empirical models of auctions ,"
Journal of Econometrics ,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 191-215.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: George Deltas & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2004.
"'Catalogue' vs 'Order-of-sale' effects in sequential auctions: theory and evidence from a rare book sale ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 28-54, 01.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fl. Menezes & P.K.Monteiro, 1994.
"Sequential Asymmetric Auctions With Endogenous Participation ,"
Microeconomics
9402001, EconWPA, revised 09 Jun 1994.
[Downloadable!]
Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist & Suresh M. Sundaresan, 2002.
"Bidder Behavior in Multiunit Auctions: Evidence from Swedish Treasury Auctions ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 394-424, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Helmut Elsinger & Christine Zulehner, 2007.
"Bidding Behavior in Austrian - Treasury Bond Auctions ,"
Monetary Policy & the Economy ,
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 2, pages 109-125, August 20.
[Downloadable!]
Avery, Christopher, 1998.
"Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997.
"Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1 ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Kahn, Charles M., 1999.
"Calibration of a model of declining prices in cattle auctions ,"
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance ,
Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 113-128.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989.
"How Auctions Work for Wine and Art ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alan Beggs & Kathryn Graddy, 1997.
"Declining Values and the Afternoon Effect: Evidence from Art Auctions ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 544-565, Autumn.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: David Neumark, 1987.
"Employers' discriminatory behavior and the estimation of wage discrimination ,"
Special Studies Papers
227, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Ossard, Herve & Vuong, Quang, 1995.
"Econometrics of First-Price Auctions ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 953-80, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Elyakime, Bernard & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Loisel, Patrice & Vuong, Quang, 1993.
"First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices ,"
IDEI Working Papers
27, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Other versions: Jeitschko, Thomas D., 1999.
"Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply ,"
Economics Letters ,
Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-72, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kenneth Hendricks & Harry J. Paarsch, 1995.
"A Survey of Recent Empirical Work Concerning Auctions ,"
Canadian Journal of Economics ,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 403-26, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Harry J. Paarsch & Han Hong, 2006.
"An Introduction to the Structural Econometrics of Auction Data ,"
MIT Press Books ,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262162350.
Oaxaca, Ronald, 1973.
"Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets ,"
International Economic Review ,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 14(3), pages 693-709, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Lawrence M. Ausubel, 2004.
"An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1452-1475, December.
[Downloadable!]
Athey, Susan & Haile, Philip A., 2007.
"Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions ,"
Handbook of Econometrics ,
in: J.J. Heckman & E.E. Leamer (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 6, chapter 60
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .