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Two-Object Two-Bidder Simultaneous Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • BALÁZS SZENTES

    (Department of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, USA)

Abstract

Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games. The games all have two identical bidders bidding in two simultaneous sealed-bid auctions for identical objects. Information is complete and the objects are either complements or substitutes. In both cases a continuum of mixed-strategy equilibria are identified. All these equilibria have a surprising structure: The supports of all the mixtures that generate equilibria are two one-dimensional curves, and they surround a two-dimensional set of pure best responses.

Suggested Citation

  • Balázs Szentes, 2007. "Two-Object Two-Bidder Simultaneous Auctions," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(03), pages 483-493.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:n:s0219198907001552
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001552
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ravi Bapna & Chrysanthos Dellarocas & Sarah Rice, 2010. "Vertically Differentiated Simultaneous Vickrey Auctions: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(7), pages 1074-1092, July.
    2. Liu, Qingmin, 2011. "Equilibrium of a sequence of auctions when bidders demand multiple items," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 192-194, August.
    3. Thomas Kittsteiner & Marion Ott & Richard Steinberg, 2022. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1130-1137, December.
    4. Ghosh, Gagan, 2021. "Simultaneous auctions with budgets: Equilibrium existence and characterization," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 75-93.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Simultaneous auctions; exposure problem; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71; Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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