Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: A "desensitizer" from uncertainty
AbstractIn the context of first-price auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders, we show that risk aversion not only increases a player's bid, but also makes him less sensitive to the probability that other bidders are informed about his private valuation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 112 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
First-price auctions Asymmetrically informed bidders Risk aversion Unknown valuations;
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