IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v106y2010i2p119-121.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Money, barter, and consumption interdependence

Author

Listed:
  • Chen, Shikuan
  • Kao, Yi-Cheng

Abstract

By introducing a degree of consumption interdependence into a search model, we show that people may switch from using money to bartering during hyperinflation, but barter activities, however, could still be popular even though the inflation rate is low.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Shikuan & Kao, Yi-Cheng, 2010. "Money, barter, and consumption interdependence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 119-121, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:2:p:119-121
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(09)00354-1
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Engineer, Merwan & Bernhardt, Dan, 1991. "Money, Barter, and the Optimality of Legal Restrictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 743-773, August.
    3. Kim, Byung-Yeon & Pirttila, Jukka, 2004. "Money, barter, and inflation in Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 297-314, June.
    4. Ritter, Joseph A, 1995. "The Transition from Barter to Fiat Money," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 134-149, March.
    5. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Eric S. Maskin, 1996. "A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(4), pages 955-1005.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Richard B. Goud Jr., 2002. "Inter-Firm Non-Monetary Transactions in Russia: A Literature Review," Development and Comp Systems 0207001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Marvasti, A. & Smyth, David J., 1999. "The effect of barter on the demand for money: an empirical analysis," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 73-80, July.
    3. Starr, Ross M., 2003. "Monetary general equilibrium with transaction costs," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 335-354, June.
    4. Fleischman, Gary & Herz, Paul, 2005. "An empirical investigation of trends in barter activity in the Russian Federation," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 39-63.
    5. Wilfredo Toledo, 2006. "El dinero en los modelos macroeconómicos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 8(15), pages 97-116, July-Dece.
    6. Maurizio Zanardi, 2004. "Antidumping law as a collusive device," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(1), pages 95-122, February.
    7. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    8. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "The Politics of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 667-690, September.
    9. Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2015. "A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 933-948, November.
    10. Mohr, Ernst, 1990. "Courts of appeal, bureaucracies and conditional project permits: The role of negotiating non-exclusive property rights over the environment," Kiel Working Papers 408, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    11. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1593-1623, September.
    12. Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2008. "Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 341-353, May.
    13. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    14. Gantner, Anita & Horn, Kristian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Fair and efficient division through unanimity bargaining when claims are subjective," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 56-73.
    15. Simon Hug & Tobias Schulz, 2007. "Referendums in the EU’s constitution building process," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 177-218, June.
    16. Eric Levin & Thomas Moutos, 1991. "Unemployment insurance and union bargaining — an insider-outsider approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 271-284, October.
    17. Norman, Peter, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February.
    18. Maryam Farboodi & Gregor Jarosch & Guido Menzio, 2016. "Intermediation as Rent Extraction," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-026, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2016.
    19. Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 181-199, October.
    20. Qian, Dong & Guo, Ju’e, 2014. "Research on the energy-saving and revenue sharing strategy of ESCOs under the uncertainty of the value of Energy Performance Contracting Projects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 710-721.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:106:y:2010:i:2:p:119-121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.