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Income, family structure, and child maltreatment risk

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  • Berger, Lawrence M.

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  • Berger, Lawrence M., 2004. "Income, family structure, and child maltreatment risk," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(8), pages 725-748, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:cysrev:v:26:y:2004:i:8:p:725-748
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