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Marriage and Divorce in a Model of Matching

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Author Info
Mumcu, Ayse
Saglam, Ismail

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Abstract

We study the problem of marriage formation and marital distribution in a two-period model of matching, extending the matching with bargaining framework of Crawford and Rochford (1986). We run simulations to find the effects of alimony rate, legal cost of divorce, initial endowments, couple and single productivity parameters on the payoffs and marital status in the society.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1907/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1907.

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Date of creation: Sep 2006
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1907

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Related research
Keywords: Matching bargaining marriage divorce

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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  1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, 2007. "Marriage and Divorce: Changes and their Driving Forces," NBER Working Papers 12944, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Justin Wolfers, 2003. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," NBER Working Papers 10014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. S. Rao Aiyagari & Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, 2000. "On the State of the Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 213-244, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Steven Stern & Michael J. Brien & Lee A. Lillard, 1999. "Cohabitation, Marriage, and Divorce in a Model of Match Quality," Virginia Economics Online Papers 322, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bennett, Elaine, 1988. "Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 392-407, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & and John Knowles, 1999. "More on marriage, fertility, and the distribution of income," Working Paper 9904, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Marianne E. Page & Ann Huff Stevens, 2002. "Will You Miss Me When I Am Gone? The Economic Consequences of Absent Parents," NBER Working Papers 8786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-54, June.
  12. Spiros Bougheas & Yannis Georgellis, 1999. "The effect of divorce costs on marriage formation and dissolution," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 489-498. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-58, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Allen, Douglas W, 1992. "Marriage and Divorce: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 679-85, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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