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Executive compensation in firms with concentrated control: The impact of dual class structure and family management

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  • Amoako-Adu, Ben
  • Baulkaran, Vishaal
  • Smith, Brian F.

Abstract

We examine how two distinct ownership forms of concentrated control affect executive compensation. We compare executive compensation in dual class firms with that in single class companies with concentrated control. Although both samples of companies have agency problems associated with concentrated control, dual class companies have additional problems associated with controlling shareholders holding smaller equity positions. We show that family members in executive positions in dual class companies are paid significantly more than those of single class companies with concentrated control. The excess is in the form of more incentive compensation (bonuses and stock options). This finding is consistent with optimal contract theory of executive compensation in that the higher compensation is given to prevent dual class executives from taking advantage of their higher voting leverage. Our results are robust to an alternative specification of voting leverage which uses the difference between voting and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders.

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  • Amoako-Adu, Ben & Baulkaran, Vishaal & Smith, Brian F., 2011. "Executive compensation in firms with concentrated control: The impact of dual class structure and family management," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1580-1594.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:17:y:2011:i:5:p:1580-1594
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.09.003
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    3. Baulkaran, Vishaal, 2014. "Management entrenchment and the valuation discount of dual class firms," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 70-81.
    4. Hyungseok Kim & Woochan Kim, 2020. "Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(9-10), pages 1268-1289, October.
    5. Hu, Fang & Pan, Xiaofei & Tian, Gary, 2013. "Does CEO pay dispersion matter in an emerging market? Evidence from China's listed firms," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 235-255.
    6. Amoako-Adu, Ben & Baulkaran, Vishaal & Smith, Brian F., 2014. "Analysis of dividend policy of dual and single class U.S corporations," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 1-29.
    7. Yves Bozec & Jackie Di Vito, 2023. "CEO Compensation in Founder-Controlled Firms: A Comparison Between Family CEOs and Non-Family CEOs," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 15(6), pages 1-44, June.
    8. Sara De Masi & Kose John & Agnieszka Słomka-Gołębiowska & Piotr Urbanek, 2023. "Regulation and post-crisis pay disclosure strategies of banks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 1243-1275, November.
    9. Croci, Ettore & Gonenc, Halit & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2012. "CEO compensation, family control, and institutional investors in Continental Europe," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(12), pages 3318-3335.
    10. Cieslak, Katarzyna & Hamberg, Mattias & Vural, Derya, 2021. "Executive compensation disclosure, ownership concentration and dual-class firms: An analysis of Swedish data," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 45(C).
    11. Gilson, Ronald J. & Schwartz, Alan, 2015. "Corporate control and credible commitment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 119-130.
    12. Feng-Li Lin, 2016. "Executive Pay and Market Value Sensitivity," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 63(4), pages 411-424, September.
    13. Słomka-Gołębiowska, Agnieszka & Urbanek, Piotr, 2016. "Corporate boards, large blockholders and executive compensation in banks: Evidence from Poland," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 203-220.
    14. Baran, Lindsay & Forst, Arno, 2015. "Disproportionate insider control and board of director characteristics," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 62-80.
    15. Cheong, Juyoung & Kim, Woochan, 2014. "Revisiting Executive Pay in Family-Controlled Firms: Family Premium in Large Business Groups," MPRA Paper 59250, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Li, Ting & Zaiats, Nataliya, 2017. "Information environment and earnings management of dual class firms around the world," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 1-23.
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    18. Cheng, Minying & Lin, Bingxuan & Wei, Minghai, 2015. "Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 238-257.
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    20. Katarzyna Cieślak, 2018. "Agency conflicts, executive compensation regulations and CEO pay-performance sensitivity: evidence from Sweden," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(3), pages 535-563, September.

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    Keywords

    Dual class; Family executive; Compensation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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