Family Control and Executive Compensation
AbstractThis paper examines the effect of family ownership and control on executive compensation in listed firms during the period 2003-2008. The descriptive statistics show that CEOs in non-family-controlled firms have a significantly higher share of variable compensation than CEOs in family-controlled firms, they also receive remuneration in stock options relatively more often. The econometric analysis shows that family control and ownership concentration reduce CEO compensation whereas multiple-class shares increase the level of compensation. In line with the findings of previous research, firm size and performance are positively related to CEO compensation.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 186.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 28 Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: 08-441 59 00
Fax: 08-441 59 29
Web page: http://www.ratio.se/
More information through EDIRC
Corporate governance; executive compensation; family ownership;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-03-08 (Business Economics)
- NEP-HME-2012-03-08 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin Korpi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.