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Interaction of information and control systems: How the perception of behavior control affects the motivational effect of relative performance information

Author

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  • Schedlinsky, Ivo
  • Schmidt, Maximilian
  • Wöhrmann, Arnt

Abstract

This study investigates the motivational effect of relative performance information (RPI) under working environments with or without surveillance, i.e., a behavioral control. We predict that surveillance negatively affects the performance-increasing effect of providing RPI and conduct a laboratory experiment to test this prediction. We manipulate surveillance by having participants work either with or without video surveillance. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the motivational effect of RPI diminishes if surveillance is present. Furthermore, we investigate the underlying mechanisms that drive our results. In particular, we find that surveillance increases perceived behavior control, eliciting individuals to perceive RPI more as a control mechanism. Our findings have important implications for firms using RPI and reveal the need to further investigate the effectiveness of incentive systems under behavior controls.

Suggested Citation

  • Schedlinsky, Ivo & Schmidt, Maximilian & Wöhrmann, Arnt, 2020. "Interaction of information and control systems: How the perception of behavior control affects the motivational effect of relative performance information," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:86:y:2020:i:c:s0361368218302022
    DOI: 10.1016/j.aos.2020.101171
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bedford, David S., 2020. "Conceptual and empirical issues in understanding management control combinations," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    2. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Papers 2111.00992, arXiv.org.
    3. David Karpa & Torben Klarl & Michael Rochlitz, 2021. "Artificial Intelligence, Surveillance, and Big Data," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2108, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Relative performance information; Surveillance; Performance; Motivation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions

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