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Randomization, Communication, and Efficiency in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

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Author Info
Kandori Michihiro () (University of Tokyo, Hongo, Bunkyo City, Tokyo, Japan)
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Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 71 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 345-353
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:71:y:2003:i:1:p:345-353

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  1. Eiichi Miyagawa & Yasuyuki Miyahara & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2004. "The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs," Discussion Papers 0405-12, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Ichiro Obara, 2008. "The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1). [Downloadable!]
  3. Hajime Kobayashi & Katsunori Ohta & Tadashi Sekiguchi, 2008. "Optimal Sharing Rules in Repeated Partnerships," KIER Working Papers 650, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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