Bank Loans Versus Bond Finance: Implications for Sovereign Debtors
AbstractThis article analyses the optimal choice between bank loans and bond finance for a sovereign debtor. It shows that if borrowers can be 'publicly monitored' by a rating agency that disseminates the information about their creditworthiness, their choice between bank loans and bond finance is determined by the trade-off between two deadweight costs: the crisis cost of default and the cost of debtor moral hazard. If crisis costs are large, sovereigns use bank loans for short-term financing and bond issuance for long-term financing. I also demonstrate that state contingent debt and IMF intervention can improve welfare. Copyright 2006 Bank of England.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 116 (2006)
Issue (Month): 510 (03)
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Other versions of this item:
- Misa Tanaka, 2005. "Bank loans versus bond finance: implications for sovereign debtors," Bank of England working papers 267, Bank of England.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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