IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-22-00546.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Capital taxation with population control

Author

Listed:
  • Laudo M Ogura

    (Grand Valley State University)

Abstract

Excessive population growth or hostility against immigrants has induced government adoption of population control measures, e.g., housing regulations and restrictive immigration laws. As labor supply becomes constrained by such measures, capital returns decrease, so that governments might want to lower taxation to avoid an ensuing capital flight. However, population control also reduces the potential congestion in the use of government-provided goods, making taxation marginally more beneficial, so a higher tax rate may be optimal when there is significant congestion.

Suggested Citation

  • Laudo M Ogura, 2022. "Capital taxation with population control," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 42(4), pages 2248-2256.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-22-00546
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2022/Volume42/EB-22-V42-I4-P185.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Schmidtke, 2021. "‘Winning Back Control’: Migration, Borders and Visions of Political Community," International Studies, , vol. 58(2), pages 150-167, April.
    2. Boaz Nandwa & Laudo Ogura, 2013. "Local urban growth controls and regional economic growth," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 51(3), pages 659-670, December.
    3. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
    2. Sandy Fréret & Denis Maguain, 2017. "The effects of agglomeration on tax competition: evidence from a two-regime spatial panel model on French data," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(6), pages 1100-1140, December.
    3. Tidiane Ly, 2018. "Sub-metropolitan tax competition with household and capital mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(5), pages 1129-1169, October.
    4. Jean Gabszewicz & Ornella Tarola & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2016. "Migration, wages and income taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 434-453, June.
    5. Zodrow, George R, 2003. "Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 10(6), pages 651-671, November.
    6. Matthieu Leprince & Sonia Paty & Emmanuelle Reulier, 2005. "Choix d'imposition et interactions spatiales entre collectivités locales. Un test sur les départements français," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(1), pages 67-93.
    7. Krautheim, Sebastian & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, Tim, 2011. "Heterogeneous firms, 'profit shifting' FDI and international tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1-2), pages 122-133, February.
    8. Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2001. "Tax incentives and the city," Economics Working Papers 631, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2001.
    9. Jie Bai & Seema Jayachandran & Edmund J Malesky & Benjamin A Olken, 2019. "Firm Growth and Corruption: Empirical Evidence from Vietnam," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(618), pages 651-677.
    10. Abderrahmane ZIAD & Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU, 2011. "Fiscal Policies and Trade: On the existence of Nash equilibria," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201112, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    11. Cassette, Aurélie & Paty, Sonia, 2006. "La concurrence fiscale entre communes est-elle plus intense en milieu urbain qu’en milieu rural ?," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 78.
    12. Grégoire Rota-Graziosi & Fayçal Sawadogo, 2020. "The tax burden on mobile network operators in Africa," Working Papers hal-03109370, HAL.
    13. George R. Zodrow, 2019. "Intrajurisdictional Capitalization and the Incidence of the Property Tax," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: George R Zodrow (ed.), TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE Selected Essays of George R. Zodrow, chapter 16, pages 489-522, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    14. Arjan Lejour & Harrie Verbon, 1997. "Tax Competition and Redistribution in a Two-Country Endogenous-Growth Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(4), pages 485-497, November.
    15. Fabien Candau & Jacques Le Cacheux, 2017. "Corporate Income Tax as a Genuine own Resource," Working papers of CATT hal-01847937, HAL.
    16. Kempf, Hubert & Rota-Graziosi, Grégoire, 2010. "Endogenizing leadership in tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 768-776, October.
    17. Wallace E. Oates & Wallace E. Oates, 2004. "Fiscal Competition and European Union: Contrasting Perspectives," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 10, pages 182-194, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Lejour, A. & Verbon, H., 1993. "Capital Mobility and Social Insurance in an Integrated Market," Papers 9379, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    19. Pierre Favardin, 1996. "La compétition entre collectivités locales," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(2), pages 365-381.
    20. Hernández-Murillo, Rubén, 2019. "Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 85-95.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Population growth control; Immigration control; Tax competition; Public goods.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-22-00546. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.