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Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness in Case of Concave Industry Revenue: a Simple Proof

Author

Listed:
  • Pierre von Mouche

    (Wageningen Universiteit)

  • Federico Quartieri

    (Universita degli studi di Napoli Federico II)

Abstract

A simple proof of an equilibrium uniqueness result by Murphy, Sherali and Soyster for homogeneous Cournot oligopolies with concave industry revenue function and convex cost functions is provided. Adapting this proof, a substantial improvement of their result is obtained; the improvement concerns capacity constraints, non-differentiable cost functions and industry revenue functions that are discontinuous at 0.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre von Mouche & Federico Quartieri, 2015. "Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness in Case of Concave Industry Revenue: a Simple Proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1299-1305.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-00729
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I2-P131.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Watts, Alison, 1996. "On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 269-285, April.
    2. Pierre von Mouche & Federico Quartieri, 2013. "On the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium in case of concave integrated price flexibility," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 707-718, November.
    3. Szidarovszky, Ferenc & Okuguchi, Koji, 1997. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 135-140, January.
    4. Ewerhart, Christian, 2014. "Cournot games with biconcave demand," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 37-47.
    5. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Quartieri, Federico, 2017. "Are vessel sharing agreements pro-competitive?," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 11, pages 33-48.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Concave industry revenue; Cournot oligopoly; equilibrium uniqueness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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