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Vertical integration through Rubinstein bargaining

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  • Derek J Clark

    ()
    (Tromsø University Business School, University of Tromsø)

  • Jean-Christophe Pereau

    ()
    (Gretha, Université de Bordeaux IV)

Abstract

We consider a vertical structure in which an upstream manufacturer bargains with a downstream retailer over the price of an intermediate good. In an alternating offers framework, we show that when the managers of the firms can choose their response time in the negotiation that the solution conforms either to the non-intergrated or fully integrated structure from standard models of successive monopoly.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I3-P242.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 32 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 2522-2529

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00585

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Related research

Keywords: bargaining; successive monopoly; asymmetric response times.;

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  1. Pierre Cahuc & Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2003. "Wage bargaining with on-the-job search : theory and evidence," Research Unit Working Papers, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA 0212, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
  2. Cramton, Peter C, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 205-25, January.
  3. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, 9.
  4. Hoel, Michael, 1986. " Perfect Equilibria in Sequential Bargaining Games with Nonlinear Utility Functions," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(2), pages 383-400.
  5. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  6. Sakovics Jozsef, 1993. "Delay in Bargaining Games with Complete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 78-95, February.
  7. Admati, Anat R & Perry, Motty, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 345-64, July.
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