Advertised meeting-the-competition clauses: collusion instead of price discrimination
AbstractPricing strategies may include the advertising of meeting-the-competition clauses (MCCs). We show in a specific spatial model scenario with differently informed consumers that MCCs primarily serve as a device to facilitate collusion instead of allowing for price discrimination between these consumers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 31 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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meeting-the-competition clauses; advertising; price discrimination; competition; collusion;
Other versions of this item:
- Oliver Budzinski & Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, 2010. "Advertised Meeting-the-Competition Clauses: Collusion Instead of Price Discrimination," Working Papers 99/10, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics
- M3 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising
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- Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
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