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Price-Matching Guarantees with Endogenous Search: A Market Experiment Approach

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  • Yuan, Hong
  • Krishna, Aradhna

Abstract

Price-matching guarantees are commonly used by sellers as promises to match the lowest price for an item that a customer can find elsewhere. In this paper, we use a market experiment approach to examine buyer search as well as sellers’ pricing decisions in the presence versus absence of Price-Matching Guarantees. We use student subjects as well as real consumers in an interactive laboratory setting to trade with each other, acting as buyers and sellers. Our findings from two experiments indicate that when searchers’ demand is more elastic than non-searchers, PMGs can result in more intense price competition, even when sellers are symmetric. Price-Matching sellers benefit from converting more consumers into searchers who buy a larger quantity at a lower price. The lower (average) market prices also benefit buyers. These implications should be of great interest to researchers, practitioners, and public policymakers.

Suggested Citation

  • Yuan, Hong & Krishna, Aradhna, 2011. "Price-Matching Guarantees with Endogenous Search: A Market Experiment Approach," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 182-193.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jouret:v:87:y:2011:i:2:p:182-193
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2011.04.002
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    Cited by:

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    2. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
    3. Diana Maria Vrânceanu & Ionel Dumitru, 2016. "An Insight on the Influence of Price-Matching Guarantees on Consumer Behaviour in Romania," International Conference on Marketing and Business Development Journal, The Bucharest University of Economic Studies, vol. 2(1), pages 109-114, July.
    4. Nicole Koschate-Fischer & Katharina Wüllner, 2017. "New developments in behavioral pricing research," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(6), pages 809-875, August.
    5. Juncai Jiang & Nanda Kumar & Brian T. Ratchford, 2017. "Price-Matching Guarantees with Endogenous Consumer Search," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(10), pages 3489-3513, October.
    6. Dutta, Sujay, 2012. "Vulnerability to Low-Price Signals: An Experimental Study of the Effectiveness of Genuine and Deceptive Signals," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 156-167.

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