This paper offers a new theory of destructive competition. We compare minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) to retail market clearing in a model with a monopolistic manufacturer selling to competitive retailers. In both the RPM and Flexible-Pricing Games, retailers must order inventories before the realization of demand uncertainty. We find that manufacturer profits and equilibrium inventories are higher under RPM than under market clearing. Surprisingly, consumer surplus can also be higher, in which case unfettered retail competition can legitimately be called destructive.
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Paper provided by Ohio State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
018.
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Canoy, Marcel & van der Ploeg, Frederick & van Ours, Jan C, 2005.
"The Economics of Books,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4892, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Canoy, Marcel & Ours, Jan C. van & Ploeg, Frederick van der, 2005.
"The economics of books,"
Discussion Paper
13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Robert L. Earle & Karl Schmedders & Tymon Tatur, 2002.
"Price Caps and Uncertain Demands,"
Discussion Papers
1340, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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