Wage discrimination and partial compliance with the minimum wage law
AbstractThis paper presents a simple model to characterize the discriminatory behavior of a non-complying firm in a minimum-wage economy. In the analysis, the violating firm pays one “favored” group of workers the statutory minimum and the other “non-favored” group of workers a sub-minimum. We find conditions under which law enforcement is ineffective in improving the between-group wage differentials. We show that an increase in the minimum wage raises the sub-minimum wage and employment of workers in the non-favored group, but reduces the employment of workers in the favored group. The effect of the minimum wage increase on total employment is unambiguously negative, however.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J4 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets
- J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
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