In this paper, we introduce firm heterogeneity in the context of a model of non-compliance with minimum wage legislation. The introduction of heterogeneity in the ease with which firms can be monitored for non compliance allows us to show that non-compliance will persist in sectors which are relatively difficult to monitor, despite the government implementing non –stochastic monitoring. Moreover, we show that the incentive not to comply is an increasing function of the level of the minimum wage and increasing function of the gap between the minimum wage and the competitive wage rate.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
17156.
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