Incentive to encourage downstream competition under bilateral oligopoly
AbstractConsider the contracting problem of an input supplier dealing with several firms that compete in an output market. We show that, contrary to the key result of the previous literature, an input supplier's profit can increase with the number of downstream firms if the upstream firm is not a monopolist but instead competes with an alternative inferior supplier.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 9 ()
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