The Effect of Leadership Transition on Government Expenditure: Evidence from China
AbstractThis paper examines the impact of leadership transition on government expenditure, particularly the composition of the expenditure. Using the Chinese provincial-level data during the period 1992-2006, we find that the transition of provincial leaders seems to have no significant effect on expenditure composition, either in the short run or long run. However, if the origins of provincial leaders are taken into consideration, only when they are from the central ministries, the replacement of the party secretary is associated with significant changes in the composition of government expenditure in the long run. Moreover, in comparison with other regions, the composition of government expenditure in autonomous regions is more likely to remain stable in the short run when the replacement of provincial party secretary occurs.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Society for AEF in its journal Annals of Economics and Finance.
Volume (Year): 13 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Replacement of provincial leaders; Composition of government expenditure; Jingguan;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
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