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Does economic performance affect officials’ turnover? Evidence from municipal government leaders in China

Author

Listed:
  • Yaobo Shi

    (Xi’an University of Technology)

  • Chun-Ping Chang

    (Shih Chien University at Kaohsiung)

  • Chyi-Lu Jang

    (National Sun Yat-Sen University)

  • Yu Hao

    (Beijing Institute of Technology
    Sustainable Development Research Institute for Economy and Society of Beijing
    Beijing Institute of Technology)

Abstract

As is well known, Chinese central government has full authority to determine the provincial and local officials’ turnover. However, China has not in detail interpreted the standards of officials’ promotions so far. In this paper, the latest database of city-level leaders for the period between 2002 and 2013 is utilized to investigate the influences of economic performance on party secretaries’ odds of being promoted. The estimation results by a panel multinomial logit method indicate that municipal annual GDP per capita is significantly positively associated with leaders’ chances of promotion. Specifically, the average GDP growth rates during leaders’ tenures have much higher effects. Moreover, some important factors of leaders’ personal characteristics also affect the political turnover. For instance, party secretaries’ connection with China’s Communist Youth League, political experience, educational level and professional expertise all have positive impacts on their chances of obtaining a promotion. In contrast, leaders’ ages and tenures are found to be negatively related to their promotion possibilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Yaobo Shi & Chun-Ping Chang & Chyi-Lu Jang & Yu Hao, 2018. "Does economic performance affect officials’ turnover? Evidence from municipal government leaders in China," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 1873-1891, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:qualqt:v:52:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s11135-017-0573-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s11135-017-0573-9
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic performance; Political turnover; Municipal government leaders; Panel multinomial logit model; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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