IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/pepspp/v22y2016i1p1-25n5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence

Author

Listed:
  • Kıbrıs Arzu
  • Kıbrıs Özgür

    (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabanci University, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey)

Abstract

Many modern armed conflicts contain more than two fighting parties, or armed opposition groups that have factions within them. It is the moderates in an armed opposition that governments negotiate with. But the agreement’s fate depends on the approval of all other significant actors within the opposition. We construct a dynamic model of conflict in which such an actor is to decide whether to accept a peace agreement signed by the moderates or not. Using this model we analyze the behavior of our decision maker, focusing on outcomes like the optimal settlement strategy, expected duration of the conflict, and the decision maker’s expected payoff from conflict. We then determine how these outcomes are affected by changes in the conflict environment. Finally, we extend our model to analyze the implications of commitment problems, and the possibility that the conflict ends with military victory of either side.

Suggested Citation

  • Kıbrıs Arzu & Kıbrıs Özgür, 2016. "On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 1-25, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:22:y:2016:i:1:p:1-25:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2015-0046
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2015-0046
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/peps-2015-0046?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Ticchi & Andrea Vindigni, 2010. "Persistence of Civil Wars," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 664-676, 04-05.
    2. Walter, Barbara F., 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 335-364, July.
    3. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(1), pages 123-133, February.
    4. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    5. Kydd, Andrew & Walter, Barbara F., 2002. "Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 263-296, April.
    6. Licklider, Roy, 1995. "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 681-690, September.
    7. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
    8. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Defense Economics," Handbook of Defense Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 1.
    9. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(6), pages 783-813, December.
    10. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Skaperdas, Stergios, 2007. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 649-709, Elsevier.
    11. de Mesquita, Ethan Bueno, 2005. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 145-176, January.
    12. Navin A. Bapat, 2005. "Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 42(6), pages 699-717, November.
    13. Powell, Robert, 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 169-203, January.
    14. Karl DeRouen Jr & Mark J Ferguson & Samuel Norton & Young Hwan Park & Jenna Lea & Ashley Streat-Bartlett, 2010. "Civil war peace agreement implementation and state capacity," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(3), pages 333-346, May.
    15. James D. Fearon, 2004. "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(3), pages 275-301, May.
    16. Joakim Kreutz, 2010. "How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 47(2), pages 243-250, March.
    17. Smith, Alastair, 1998. "International Crises and Domestic Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 92(3), pages 623-638, September.
    18. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kazuhiro Obayashi, 2014. "Information, rebel organization and civil war escalation: The case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 17(1), pages 21-40, March.
    2. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, January.
    3. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    4. Tridimas, George, 2011. "The political economy of power-sharing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 328-342, June.
    5. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    6. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.
    7. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2010. "Civil War," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 3-57, March.
    8. Thomas Edward Flores & Irfan Nooruddin, 2011. "Credible Commitment in Post-Conflict Recovery," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 23, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Clayton Thyne, 2017. "The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 287-307, May.
    10. Albornoz, Facundo & Hauk, Esther, 2014. "Civil war and U.S. foreign influence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 64-78.
    11. Christopher Blattman, 2009. "Civil War: A Review of Fifty Years of Research," Working Papers id:2231, eSocialSciences.
    12. Dominic Rohner, 2018. "Success Factors for Peace Treaties: A Review of Theory and Evidence," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 18.08, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    13. Michaela Mattes & Burcu Savun, 2010. "Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of Civil War Settlements," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 511-524, April.
    14. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    15. Garfinkel, Michelle R. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 2021. "Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 148-178.
    16. Magnus Lundgren, 2017. "Which type of international organizations can settle civil wars?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 613-641, December.
    17. Nobuhiro Mizuno & Ryosuke Okazawa, 2017. "Within-group heterogeneity and civil war," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 153-177, May.
    18. Gries, Thomas & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War' '- Compromise for Peace versus Conventional, Guerilla, or Terrorist Warfare," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145617, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Thomas Gries & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2016. "An Economic Theory of 'Destabilization War'," Working Papers CIE 95, Paderborn University, CIE Center for International Economics.
    20. Paul F. Diehl, 2006. "Just a Phase?: Integrating Conflict Dynamics Over Time," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(3), pages 199-210, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:22:y:2016:i:1:p:1-25:n:5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.