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A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

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  • Yokoo Hide-Fumi

    (Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8601, Japan)

Abstract

I develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

Suggested Citation

  • Yokoo Hide-Fumi, 2020. "A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(2), pages 1-5, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:20:y:2020:i:2:p:5:n:11
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2019-0066
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    References listed on IDEAS

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