The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance in the Lab: Effect on Quantities, Prices, and Implications for the Design of a Cost-Effective Policy
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2014-0202
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- Carol Luengo & Marcelo Caffera & Carlos Chávez, 2020. "Uncertain penalties and compliance: experimental evidence," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 22(2), pages 197-216, April.
- Song Jiang & Shuang Qiu & Hong Zhou & Meilan Chen, 2019. "Can FinTech Development Curb Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution?," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(22), pages 1-22, November.
- Carol Luengo & Marcelo Caffera & Carlos Chávez, 2014.
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1407, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Marcelo Caffera & Carlos Chávez & Carol Luengo, 2019. "Uncertain Penalties and Compliance," Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers 1907, Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo..
- Luengo, Carol & Caffera, Marcelo & Chávez, Carlos, 2018. "Uncertain Penalties and Compliance," MPRA Paper 90945, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wang, M. & Zhou, P., 2022. "A two-step auction-refund allocation rule of CO2 emission permits," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
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