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Relocation Opportunities and Mortgage Default

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  • S. Michael Giliberto
  • Arthur L. Houston

Abstract

This paper presents a theoretical model of residential mortgage default when borrowers face beneficial as well as costly relocation opportunities. It amplifies and extends previous work by providing explicit conditions leading to default. The model also establishes when a borrower's relocation decision and default decision are dependent and when they are not. A central result is that there is a range of book equity wherein the decision to default is not determined solely by the current level of equity or the borrower's ability to continue the mortgage payments. Rather, various costs and benefits, both tangible and intangible, enter into the decision. Specific conditions are identified that lead to relocation without default, default and relocation, and no default or relocation. The effects of changes in the variables upon default probability are presented. Assuming that the borrower does not wish to retain ownership in the property, the model also predicts whether an individual borrower will choose prepayment or default when a relocation is made. The choice depends on the value of the relocation opportunity faced by the borrower, as well as financial variables such as house value, mortgage balance, and transaction costs. This finding suggests that existing empirical analyses of default may have omitted explanatory variables.

Suggested Citation

  • S. Michael Giliberto & Arthur L. Houston, 1989. "Relocation Opportunities and Mortgage Default," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(1), pages 55-69, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:reesec:v:17:y:1989:i:1:p:55-69
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-6229.00473
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John P. Herzog & James S. Earley, 1970. "Home Mortgage Delinquency and Foreclosure," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number herz70-1, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas M. Springer & Neil G. Waller, 1993. "Lender Forbearance: Evidence from Mortgage Delinquency Patterns," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 21(1), pages 27-46, March.
    2. Andrew H. Chen & David C. Ling, 1989. "Optimal Mortgage Refinancing with Stochastic Interest Rates," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(3), pages 278-299, September.
    3. Seow Ong & Tien Sing & Alan Teo, 2007. "Delinquency and Default in Arms: The Effects of Protected Equity and Loss Aversion," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 253-280, October.
    4. Seow Ong & Poh Neo & Yong Tu, 2008. "Foreclosure Sales: The Effects of Price Expectations, Volatility and Equity Losses," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(3), pages 265-287, April.
    5. Giacomo De Giorgi & Costanza Naguib, 2022. "Life after Default: Credit Hardship and its Effects," Diskussionsschriften dp2206, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    6. Bhattacharya, Arnab & Wilson, Simon P. & Soyer, Refik, 2019. "A Bayesian approach to modeling mortgage default and prepayment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 274(3), pages 1112-1124.
    7. Dietz, Robert D. & Haurin, Donald R., 2003. "The social and private micro-level consequences of homeownership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 401-450, November.
    8. Richard Anderson & James VanderHoff, 1999. "Mortgage Default Rates and Borrower Race," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 18(2), pages 279-290.
    9. Patric H. Hendershott & William R. Schultz, 1993. "Equity and Nonequity Determinants of FHA Single‐Family Mortgage Foreclosures in the 1980s," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 21(4), pages 405-430, December.
    10. Giacomo De Giorgi & Costanza Naguib, 2023. "Life after (Soft) Default," Papers 2306.00574, arXiv.org.
    11. Refik Soyer & Feng Xu, 2010. "Assessment of mortgage default risk via Bayesian reliability models," Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(3), pages 308-330, May.

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