Optimal Fiscal Policy in an Economy Facing Sociopolitical Instability
AbstractThe paper presents a model of optimal government policy when policy choices may exacerbate sociopolitical instability (SPI). The authors show that optimal policy that takes into account SPI transforms a standard concave growth model into a model with both a poverty trap and endogenous growth. The resulting equilibrium dynamics inherit the properties of government policies and need not be monotone. Indeed, for a broad set of conditions, government policy is unable to eliminate the poverty trap; when these conditions do not hold, "most" countries eventually reach a balanced growth path. The predictions of the model are tested by developing three new measures of SPI for a panel of 58 countries. Estimating optimal policies and the growth equation derived from the model reveals strong support for the theory. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Review of Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 7 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1363-6669
Other versions of this item:
- Chetan Ghate & Quan Vu Le & Paul J. Zak, 2002. "Optimal Fiscal Policy in an Economy Facing Socio-Political Instability," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 308, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- O40 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
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