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Contests, Managerial Incentives, Stock Price Manipulation, and Advance Selling Strategies: Introduction

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  • Cheng-Zhong Qin

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  • Cheng-Zhong Qin, 2013. "Contests, Managerial Incentives, Stock Price Manipulation, and Advance Selling Strategies: Introduction," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(2), pages 162-163, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:18:y:2013:i:2:p:162-163
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gradstein, Mark & Konrad, Kai A, 1999. "Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(458), pages 536-545, October.
    2. Amegashie, J Atsu, 1999. "The Design of Rent-Seeking Competitions: Committees, Preliminary and Final Contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 63-76, April.
    3. Fishman, Michael J & Hagerty, Kathleen M, 1995. "The Mandatory Disclosure of Trades and Market Liquidity," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 637-676.
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