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Discontinuous Payoffs, Shared Resources, and Games of Fiscal Competition: Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

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Author Info
PAUL ROTHSTEIN

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Abstract

We define a class of games with discontinuous payoffs that we call shared resource games and establish a pure strategy Nash equilibrium existence theorem for these games. We then apply this result to a canonical game of fiscal competition for mobile capital. Other applications are also discussed. Our result for the mobile capital game holds for any finite number of regions, permits general preferences over private and public goods, and does not assume that production technologies have a particular functional form, or are identical in all regions, or satisfy the Inada condition at zero. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2007.00310.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 9 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 335-368
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:9:y:2007:i:2:p:335-368

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923

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  1. Ben Zissimos & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006. "Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation," Working Papers 0601, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2009. "The Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous and Nonconvex Games," Working Papers 2008-ECO-14, IESEG School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  3. Amrita Dhillon & Myrna H. Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2006. "Tax Competition Reconsidered," Working Papers 0602, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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