Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity

Contents:

Author Info

  • CLARE LEAVER
  • MILTIADIS MAKRIS

Abstract

We seek to explain the puzzle of passive industry interests. Taking the formation decision as given, we focus on the ability of a political action committee (PAC) to elicit voluntary donations for campaign giving. We show that, when the number of stakeholders is large and uncertain, PACs behave counteractively. That is, a single PAC that does not oppose the government's prior preference raises resources whenever an opponent poses a credible threat to secure policy favors. By implication money never actually changes hands, prompting the suggestion that counteractive behavior may lie behind the well-documented, and consistently low, levels of PAC disbursements. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00279.x
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 8 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Pages: 571-602

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:4:p:571-602

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Michela Redoano, 2007. "Does Centralization Affect the Number and Size of Lobbies?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1968, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2002. "'Plata o Plomo': Bribe and Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence," Working Papers 2002-28, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Zudenkova, Galina, 2012. "Lobbying as a Guard against Extremism," Working Papers 2072/184036, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  4. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "Sincere Lobby Formation," MPRA Paper 28249, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:4:p:571-602. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.