The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement
AbstractThis paper studies a model where the existence of a pension system is decided by majority voting. We assume that individuals have the same income but different longevity. Retirement is voluntary and the pension system is characterised by a payroll tax on earnings and a flat pension benefit. Individuals vote only on the tax level. We show that a pension system emerges when there is a majority of long-lived individuals and that voluntary retirement enables to lower the size of the transfers received by the long-lived. A rise in average longevity will also increase the size of the pension system. Copyright � 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 12 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
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- Leroux, Marie-Louise & Pestieau, Pierre & Racionero, María, 2011.
"Voting on pensions: Sex and marriage,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 281-296, June.
- LEROUX, Marie-Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre & RACIONERO, Maria, 2009. "Voting on pensions : sex and marriage," CORE Discussion Papers 2009057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- LEROUX, Marie-Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre & RACIONERO, Maria, . "Voting on pensions: sex and marriage," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2308, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- LEROUX, Marie-Louise & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2011. "Social security and family support," CORE Discussion Papers 2011045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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