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Is there a Political Support for the Double Burden on Prolonged Activity?

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Author Info

  • Georges Casamatta

    ()

  • Helmuth Cremer

    ()

  • Pierre Pestieau

    ()

Abstract

In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-005-0001-9
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 7 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 143-154

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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:2:p:143-154

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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm

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Related research

Keywords: Social security; Pensions; Retirement age; Implicit taxation; H55; D72;

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References

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  1. Courtney Coile & Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Social Security and Retirement," NBER Working Papers 7830, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Dolado, Juan José & Jimeno, Juan F. & Boldrin, Michele & Peracchi, Franco, . "The Future of Pensions in Europe," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3271, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  3. Paola Profeta, 2002. "Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 331-348, August.
  4. Conde-Ruiz, J.I. & Galasso, V., 2000. "Early Retirement," Economics Working Papers eco2000/24, European University Institute.
  5. Coughlin, Peter & Nitzan, Shmuel, 1981. "Electoral outcomes with probabilistic voting and Nash social welfare maxima," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 113-121, February.
  6. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," CEPR Discussion Papers 1054, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2006. "Social Security and Retirement Decision: A Positive and Normative Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 5542, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2010. "Retirement and Social Security: A Political Economy Perspective," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 10-04, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  3. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Retirement and social security: the roles of self-fulfilling expectations and educational investments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 353-383, December.
  4. Jenny De Freitas, 2009. "A Probabilistic Voting Model of Progressive Taxation with Incentive Effects," DEA Working Papers 34, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.
  5. Pascal Belan & Pierre-Jean Messe & François-Charles Wolff, 2010. "Postponing retirement age and labor force participation : the role of family transfers," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2010041, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).

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