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Is there a political support for the double burden on prolonged activity?

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  • CASAMATTA, Georges
  • CREMER, Helmuth
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

In many countries elderly workers are subject to a double distortion when they consider prolonging their activity: the payroll tax and a reduction in their pension rights. It is often argued that such a double burden would not be socially desirable. We consider a setting where it would be rejected by both a utilitarian and a Rawlsian social planner. Furthermore, each individual would also reject it as a citizen candidate. We show that the double burden may nevertheless be (second-best) Pareto efficient and can be supported by a particular structure of social weights biased towards the more productive workers.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • CASAMATTA, Georges & CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2006. "Is there a political support for the double burden on prolonged activity?," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1865, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1865
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-005-0001-9
    Note: In : Economics of Governance, 7, 143-154, 2006.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
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    3. Conde-Ruiz, J. Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2004. "The macroeconomics of early retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1849-1869, August.
    4. J. Ignacio Conde-Ruiz & Vincenzo Galasso, 2003. "Early Retirement," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 12-36, January.
    5. Jonathan Gruber & David A. Wise, 1999. "Social Security and Retirement around the World," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number grub99-1, February.
    6. Paola Profeta, 2002. "Retirement and Social Security in a Probabilistic Voting Model," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 9(4), pages 331-348, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marie‐Louise Leroux, 2010. "The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 151-170, February.
    2. Helmuth Cremer & Jean‐Marie Lozachmeur & Pierre Pestieau, 2008. "Social Security And Retirement Decision: A Positive And Normative Approach," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 213-233, April.
    3. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2010. "Retirement and Social Security: A Political Economy Perspective," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 10-04-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Andreas Oestreicher & Reinald Koch, 2011. "The Revenue Consequences of Using a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base to Determine Taxable Income in the EU Member States," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 67(1), pages 64-102, March.
    5. Ryo Arawatari & Tetsuo Ono, 2011. "Retirement and social security: the roles of self-fulfilling expectations and educational investments," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 353-383, December.
    6. Jenny de Freitas, 2009. "A probabilistic voting model of progressive taxation with incentive effects," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 190(3), pages 9-26, September.
    7. Pascal Belan & Pierre-Jean Messe & François-Charles Wolff, 2010. "Postponing retirement age and labor force participation: the role of family transfers," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 76(4), pages 347-370.
    8. Georges Casamatta & L. Batté, 2016. "The Political Economy of Population Aging," Post-Print hal-02520521, HAL.
    9. Casamatta, G. & Batté, L., 2016. "The Political Economy of Population Aging," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 381-444, Elsevier.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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