"I analyze a model of competition between two market makers who are located at the opposite ends of the Hotelling line, both of which are also occupied by a search market. Buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed between the two market places, yet can only trade at one of them. In equilibrium, market makers net a positive profit and trade with buyers and sellers close to them, while buyers and sellers further away participate in search markets. Interestingly, a duopolistic market maker nets a larger profit than a monopoly because search markets make the quantities market makers trade strategic complements." Copyright 2007, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing.
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Volume (Year): 16 (2007) Issue (Month): 4 (December) Pages: 793-825 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jean-Charles Rochet Author-Email: rochet@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse & Jean Tirole Author-Email: tirole@cict.fr Author-Workplace-Name: IDEI, University of Toulouse, 2006.
"Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, Autumn.